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Abstract. An important goal of statistical relational learning formalisms
is to develop representations that are compact and expressive but also
easy to read and maintain. This is can be achieved by exploiting the
modularity of rule-based structures and is related to the noisy-or struc-
ture where parents independently influence a joint effect. Typically, these
rules are combined in an additive manner where a new rule increases the
probability of the effect. In this paper, we present a new language feature
for CP-logic, where we allow negation in the head of rules to express the
inhibition of an effect in a modular manner. This is a generalization of
the inhibited noisy-or structure that can deal with cycles and, foremost,
is non-conflicting. We introduce syntax and semantics for this feature
and show how this is a natural counterpart to the standard noisy-or.
Experimentally, we illustrate that in practice there is no additional cost
when performing inference compared to a noisy-or structure.
Keywords: Statistical Relational Learning, Bayesian networks, Noisy-
or, Inhibited noisy-or, CP-logic
1 Introduction
Statistical Relational Learning (SRL) [7] and probabilistic logic learning [2] are
concerned with representations that combine the benefits of probabilistic models,
such as Bayesian networks, with those of logic representations, such as first-order
logic. In this work we focus on the family of SRL formalisms that associate
probabilities to directed logic programming rules and can be interpreted as cause-
effect pairs (e.g. CP-logic [17], ProbLog [6] or PRISM [14]).
An important goal of these formalism is to develop representations that are
easy to read and maintain. One way in which they attempt to achieve this is by
exploiting the inherent modularity of the rule-based structure of logic programs.
We will illustrate this using CP-logic because of its intuitive, causal interpreta-
tion but the results are generally applicable. A CP-logic theory consists of a set of
rules, and each rule is viewed as an independent causal mechanism. This makes
it easy to update an existing theory by adding a (newly discovered) causal mech-
anism, since none of the existing rules have to be touched. In certain restricted
cases, a theory in CP-logic can be translated into a Bayesian network in a very
straightforward way. The translation may preserve this modularity property by
using noisy-or nodes to represent the joint effect of different rules with the same
head (i.e., different rules that may independently cause the same effect). It has
been shown that the use of such noisy-or nodes in Bayesian networks makes it
easier for human experts to supply probabilities and build more accurate models
[18]. This is further evidence for the importance of this modularity property in
probabilistic logics.
Currently, however, CP-logic’s modularity is limited, in the sense that each
new rule that is added for a given effect can only increase its probability. In
practice, it occurs just as often that an existing theory has to be modified because
a previously unknown mechanism makes some effect less likely in certain cases.
CP-logic currently offers no modular way of adding such a new mechanism to
an existing theory—it always requires changes to existing rules. In this paper,
we present a new language feature, where we allow negation in the head of rules.
We develop a syntax and semantics for this feature, and demonstrate that it
indeed extends the modularity property to the discovery of new mechanisms that
decrease the probability of existing events. In the special case where the CP-logic
theory can easily be translated to a Bayesian network, we show that this feature
of negation in the head reduces to an inhibited noisy-or structure [4]. While this
is a little known kind of node in the literature on probabilistic graphical models,
our analysis shows that it is a natural counterpart to the standard noisy-or.
Additionally, we show experimentally that this intuitive structure exhibits the
same advantageous properties as a noisy-or structure such as a linear number of
parameters and inference that is polynomial in the number of parents.
2 Preliminaries and Motivation
CP-logic offers a compact and robust way of specifying certain kinds of proba-
bility distributions. This is due to three interacting properties:
– Different causes for the same effect can be represented as separate rules,
each with their own probabilities, which are combined with a noisy-or when
necessary. This leads to a modular representation.
– Logical variables may be used to write down first-order rules that serve as
templates for sets of propositional rules. In this way, very compact represen-
tations can be achieved.
– The semantics of CP-logic is defined in a robust way, allowing, in particular,
also cycles in the possible cause-effect relations.
To illustrate these properties, consider the following example.
Example 1. An infectious disease spreads through a population as follows: when-
ever two people are in regular contact with each other and one is infected, there
is a probability of 0.6 of the infection spreading also to the other person. Given
a set of initially infected people and a graph of connections between individuals
in the population, the goal is to predict the spread of the disease.
In CP-logic, this can be represented by a set of two rules:
(Inf (x) : 1.0)← InitialInf (x). (1)
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y). (2)
Given any set of individuals and any interpretation for the exogenous predicates
InitialInf and Contact , this CP-theory defines the probability with which each
individual will be infected. In particular, no restrictions (such as acyclicity) are
imposed on the Contact-relation.
In addition to representing probability distributions in a compact way, CP-
logic also aims at being elaboration tolerant: once a CP-theory for a given domain
has been constructed, it should be easy to adapt this theory when we learn new
facts about the domain. Ideally, new knowledge should be incorporated in a way
which respects the inherent modularity of CP-logic, in the sense that it may
involve adding or removing rules, but not changing existing rules.
One such operation for which CP-logic is obviously well-suited is when a
new cause for some effect is discovered. For instance, suppose we learn that,
in addition to being among the initially infected and having contact with in-
fected individuals from the population, people may also contract the disease by
travelling to particular locations (e.g., with probability 0.2). We can update our
CP-logic model accordingly, by simply adding an additional rule:
(Inf (x) : 1.0)← InitialInf (x).
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y).
(Inf (x) : 0.2)← RiskyTravel(x).
Importantly, there is no need to change our existing rules.
A second operation is discovering that certain parts of the population form
an exception to the general rules. For instance, suppose that certain people are
discovered to be especially susceptible (e.g., probability 0.8) to contracting the
disease through contact with an already infected person. We can represent this
by “case splitting” rule (2) into the following two rules:
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y) ∧ ¬Susceptible(x).
(Inf (x) : 0.8)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y) ∧ Susceptible(x).
However, this solution has the downside that it forces us to change an existing
rule. A better alternative is to exploit the additive nature of different causes for
the same effect in CP-logic:
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y).
(Inf (x) : 0.5)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y) ∧ Susceptible(x).
For non-susceptible individuals, only the first rule is applicable, so they still get
infected with the same probability of 0.6 as before. The same rule of course also
applies to susceptible individuals, whom the second rule then gives an additional
probability of getting infected because they are susceptible. This brings their total
probability of being infected up to 0.6 + (1− 0.6) · 0.5 = 0.8. When compared to
the “case splitting” theory, this representation has the advantage that it allows
the “default” rule for normal people to remain unchanged.
In addition to discovering that certain parts of the population are especially
susceptible to the infection, it is equally possible to discover that certain people
tend to be more resistant to it. Again, this can be solved by case splitting:
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y) ∧ ¬Resistant(x).
(Inf (x) : 0.4)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y) ∧ Resistant(x).
A solution in which we can keep our original “default” rule unchanged is not
possible using noisy-or or is not intuitive to impossible in current probabilistic
logics. Indeed, this is an obvious consequence of the fact that adding additional
rules can only increase probabilities. In this paper, we introduce the new feature
of negation in the head of rules, which will allow us to represent also a decrease
in probabilities. In particular, we will be able to represent our example as:
(Inf (x) : 0.6)← Contact(x, y) ∧ Inf (y).
(¬Inf (x) : 1/3)← Resistant(x).
3 Preliminaries: Formal Semantics of CP-logic
A theory in CP-logic [17] consists of a set of CP-laws of the form: ∀x (A1 :
α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (An : αn) ← φ. Here, φ is a conjunction of literals and the Ai are
atoms, such that the tuple of logic variables x contains all free logic variables
in φ and the Ai. The αi are non-zero probabilities with
∑
αi ≤ 1. Such a rule
expresses that φ causes some (implicit) non-deterministic event, of which each
Ai is a possible outcome with probability αi. If
∑
i αi = 1, then at least one of
the possible effects Ai must result if the event caused by φ happens; otherwise,
the event may happen without any (visible) effect on the state of the world. For
a CP-law r, we refer to φ as body(r), and to the sequence (Ai, αi)
n
i=1 as head(r).
The semantics of a theory in CP-logic is defined in terms of its grounding, so
from now on we will restrict attention to ground theories, in which each tuple of
logic variables x is empty. Any theory can be made ground by replacing the logic
variables by constants. A ground atom can be considered as a binary random
variable.
Example 2. Suzy and Billy may each decide to throw a rock at a bottle. Suzy
throws with probability 0.5 and if she does, her rock breaks the bottle with
probability 0.8. Billy always throws and his rock hits with probability 0.6.
(Throws(Suzy) : 0.5).
(Throws(Billy) : 1).
(Broken : 0.8)← Throws(Suzy).
(Broken : 0.6)← Throws(Billy).
The semantics of CP-logic is defined using the concept of an execution model.
This is a probability tree in which each node s is labeled with a set of partial
truth value assignments to atoms, which we denote as an interpretation I(s).
Such trees are constructed, starting from a root node in which all atoms are
false, by “firing” rules whose body holds. The following is an execution model
for Example 2. States s in which the bottle is broken (i.e., I(s) |= Broken) are
represented by an empty circle, and those in which it is still whole by a full one.
•
0.5
Suzy throws
uu 0.5
doesn’t throw
))•
0.8
Bottle breaks
uu 0.2
doesn’t break
))
•
1
Billy throws
◦
1
Billy throws

•
1
Billy throws

•
0.6
Bottle breaks
 0.4
doens’t break
))◦
0.6
Bottle breaks
 0.4
doesn’t break
))
•
0.6
Bottle breaks
 0.4
doesn’t break
))
◦ •
◦ ◦ ◦ •
Each such tree defines a probability distribution over its leaves, which induces
a probability distribution over the interpretations I(s) that are associated to
these leaves. A CP-theory may have many execution models, which differ in the
order in which they fire rules. The differences between these trees are irrelevant,
in the sense that they all produce the same probability distribution piT in the
end [17].
The above example can easily be represented as a Bayesian network, where
Broken is a noisy-or node with Throws(Suzy) and Throws(Billy) as its par-
ents. This is in general the case for CP-theories that are acyclic [12]. Naively
translating a CP-theory that is not acyclic to a Bayesian network would produce
a cyclic graph.
The execution model semantics of CP-logic elegantly handles such cycles.
As an example, we consider the following small instantiation of the previous
example:
Inf (Alice)← InitialInf (Alice).
Inf (Bob)← InitialInf (Bob).
(Inf (Alice) : 0.2)← RiskyTravel(Alice).
(Inf (Bob) : 0.2)← RiskyTravel(Bob).
(Inf (Bob) : 0.6)← Inf (Alice).
(Inf (Alice) : 0.6)← Inf (Bob).
In the root of the execution model of this theory, Inf (x) is still false for all x.
It is only by applying the different rules that Alice and Bob may get infected.
This ensure that the causal cycle between Inf (Alice) and Inf (Bob) is interpreted
correctly and that, in particular, they cannot each cause the other to be infected
unless at least one of them was also initially infected or infected by risky travel.
However, this same property also makes it tricky to interpret negation in rule
bodies. For instance, suppose we also have a rule:
Quarantine(x)← ¬Inf (x).
In the root of the tree, ¬Inf (x) still holds for all x — including those for which
InitialInf (x) holds! Naive application of this rule could therefore lead us to
conclude that also initially infected people need to be quarantined, which is
clearly not intended. To solve this problem, each node s in an execution model
not only keeps track of an interpretation I(s) that represents the actual state of
the world in that node, but also of an overestimate U(s) that looks ahead in the
causal process to see which atoms could potentially still be caused. As long as
an atom A ∈ U(s), it is still possible that A will be caused further on in the tree,
even if at the current node it is still the case that I(s) 6|= A. While A ∈ U(s),
a rule that depends on the negative literal ¬A will therefore be prevented from
firing. We omit the formal details of how this U(s) is computed, but they can be
found in [17].
To translate cyclic CP-theories into Bayesian networks, it is typically neces-
sary to introduce additional nodes:
InitialInf(Alice)
((
RiskyTravel(Alice)

RiskyTravel(Bob)

InitialInf(Bob)

vv
CauseForInf(Alice)
,,vv
CauseForInf(Bob)
rr ((
Inf(Alice) Inf(Bob)
In general, this translation requires the addition of n2 of such new nodes in order
to eliminate a cycle between n nodes. For large CP-theories, such a blow-up may
render inference intractable. Moreover, because all of these new nodes are latent,
they also make the network harder to interpret or learn. Finally, because this
translation needs to consider the cycle as a whole, it may no longer be possible
to update the resulting network in a modular way.
4 Bayesian Net Interpretation for Negation in the Head
We now investigate how the semantics of CP-logic can be extended to accomo-
date negative literals in the head. Before addressing this question in general,
we first focus on a fragment of CP-logic that can be trivially translated into
a Bayesian net, namely, that of ground, acyclic CP-theories in which each rule
has only one atom in the head. We first show how the idea behind noisy-or
can be extended to accomodate negative literals in this simple fragment, before
investigating—in the next section—how this result can be extended to the whole
of CP-logic.
Y : 0.6← X0.
Y : 0.3← X1.
. . .
Y : 0.4← Xn.
X0 · · · Xi · · · Xn
X ′0 · · · X ′i · · · X ′n
Y
Fig. 1. CP-logic theory and the equivalent noisy-or Bayesian network
When adding a rule (Y : θi) ← Xi to a CP-logic theory, we increase the
probability of Y being true given that condition Xi is true. This is equivalent to
adding an additional parent Xi to a noisy-or construct (see Figure 1) and the
probability of Y given the parents Xi can be calculated with:
Pr(Y = > | X0:n) = 1−
∏
i∈[0,n]
Xi=>
(1− θi) =
∑
i∈[0,n]
Xi=>
weighing︷ ︸︸ ︷∏
j∈[0,i[
Xj=>
(1− θj) ·θi
To adhere to the laws of probability, the total probability that Y is true should
be equal or less than 1.0. The noisy-or structure achieves this by weighing each
contribution of a parent by the remainder of the total probability of the parents
already taken into account. The weighing expresses the probability that the
variable is not true due to any of the previous probabilities (see also Figure 2).
Suppose we now add a rule (¬Y : θn+1)← Xn+1, which expresses a reduction
of the probability that Y is true if Xi is true. In this case we need to ensure
that the probability of Y is equal or larger than 0. Similar to noisy-or, we can
achieve this by weighing the probability we are subtracting. In this case, the
weighing factor is the total probability that Y is true because of any of the
previous (positive) parents (see Figure 2).
Pr(Y = > | X0:n, Xn+1 = >) = Pr(Y = > | X0:n)−
weighing︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr(Y = > | X0:n) ·θn+1
= Pr(Y = > | X0:n) · (1− θn+1)
When adding multiple rules with negative literals in the head
¬Y : θn+1 ← Xn+1., . . ., ¬Y : θm ← Xm, the computation of the probability of
Y can be generalized to:
Pr(Y = > | X0:m) = Pr(Y = > | X0:n) ·
1− ∑
i∈]n,m]
Xi=>
∏
j∈]n,i[
Xj=>
(1− θj) · θi
 (3)
= Pr(Y = > | X0:n) · (1− Pr(Y = ⊥ | Xn+1:m)) (4)
To represent Formula 4 as a Bayesian net it must to be expressed as a set
of conditional probability tables. Given two auxiliary variables P and N with
Pr
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Y : 0.6← X0.
Y : 0.3← X1.
P r(y|x0, x1) = 0.72
Pr(y|x0, x1)
= 0.6 + 0.12 = 0.72
(1− Pr(y|x0, x¯1)) · Pr(y|x¯0, x1)
= (1− 0.6) · 0.3 = 0.12
Pr(y|x0, x¯1) = 0.6
Pr(y|x¯0, x¯1) = 0.0
Pr
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Y : 0.6← X0.
¬Y : 0.3← X1.
P r(y|x0, x1) = 0.42
Pr(y|x0, x1)
= 0.6− 1.8 = 0.42
Pr(y|x0, x¯1) · Pr(y|x¯0, x1)
= 0.6 · 0.3 = 0.18
Pr(y|x0, x¯1) = 0.6
Pr(y|x¯0, x¯1) = 0.0
Fig. 2. Interpretation for probability scaling. For brevity we write X = > as x and
X = ⊥ as x¯.
respectively the noisy-or structures Pr(Y | X0:n) and Pr(Y | Xn+1:m), the
formula Pr(Y | X0:m) can now be written as Pr(Y | P,N). The conditional
probability table for this last conditional probability distribution is equivalent
to Y ⇔ P ∧ ¬N (see Figure 3).
Y : 0.6← X0.
Y : 0.3← X1.
. . .
Y : 0.4← Xn.
¬Y : 0.3← Xn+1.
. . .
¬Y : 0.5← Xm.
X0 · · · Xn Xn+1 · · · Xm
X ′0 · · · X ′n X ′n+1 · · · X ′m
P N
Y
P N Y Pr
0 0 0 1.0
0 0 1 0.0
0 1 0 1.0
0 1 1 0.0
1 0 0 0.0
1 0 1 1.0
1 1 0 1.0
1 1 1 0.0
Fig. 3. Bayesian network that efficiently encodes an inhibited noisy-or. P is a noisy-or
for X0, . . . , Xn and N for Xn+1, . . . , Xm.
5 Generalization to CP-logic Programs
We now examine how we can incorporate the intuitions of the previous section
into the general setting of CP-logic. To be more precise, from now on, we allow
rules of the form:
∀x (L1 : α1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ln : αn)← φ.
Here, φ is again a first-order logic formula with x as free logic variables and the
αi ∈ [0, 1] are again such that Σαi ≤ 1. Each of the Li is now either a positive
effect literal A (i.e., an atom) or a negative effect literal ¬A.
While the goal of this extension is of course to be able to represent such
phenomena as described in Section 2, let us first take a step back and consider,
in the abstract, which possible meanings this construct could reasonably have.
Clearly, if for some atom A only positive effect literals are caused, the atom
should end up being true, just as it always has. Similarly, if only negative effect
literals ¬A are caused, the atom A should be false. However, this does not even
depend on the negative effect literals being present: because false is the default
value in CP-logic, an atom will already be false whenever there are no positive
effect literals for it, even if there are no negative effect literals either.
The only question, therefore, is what should happen if, for some A, both a
positive and a negative effect literal are caused. One alternative could be that
the result would somehow depend on the relative strength of the negative and
positive effects, e.g., whether the power of aspirin to prevent a fever is “stronger”
than the power of flu to cause it. However, such a semantics would be a con-
siderable departure from the original version of CP-logic, in which cumulative
effects (synergy, interference, . . . ) are strictly ignored. In other words, CP-logic
currently makes no distinction whatsoever between a headache that is simul-
taneously caused by five different conditions and a headache that has just a
single cause. This design decision was made to avoid a logic that, in addition to
probabilities, would also need to keep track of the degree to which a property
holds. A logic combining probabilities with such fuzzy truth degrees would, in
our opinion, become quite complex and hard to understand.
In this paper, we want to preserve the relative simplicity of CP-logic, and we
will therefore again choose not to work with degrees of truth. Therefore, only
two options remain: when both effect literals A and ¬A are caused, the end
result must be that A is either true of false. This basically means that, in the
presence of both kinds of effect literals, we have to ignore one kind. It is obvious
what this choice should be: the negative effect literals already have no impact
on the semantics when there are only positive effect literals or when there are no
positive effect literals, so if they would also have no impact when positive and
negative effect literals are both present, then they would have never have any
impact at all and we would have introduced a completely superfluous language
construct. Therefore, the only reasonable choice is to give negative effect literals
precedence over positive ones, that is, an atom A will be true if and only if it is
caused at least once and no negative effect literal ¬A is caused.
This can be formally defined by a minor change to the existing semantics
of CP-logic. Recall that, in the current semantics, each node s of an execution
model has an associated interpretation I(s), representing the current state of
the world, and an associated three-valued interpretation U(s), representing an
overestimate of all that could still be caused in s. We now add to this a third
set, namely a set of atoms N (s), containing all atoms for which a negative effect
literal has already been caused. The sets I(s) and N (s) evolve throughout an
execution model as follows:
– In the root of the tree, I(s) = N (s) = {}
– When a negative effect literal ¬A is caused in a node s, the execution model
adds a child s′ to s such that:
• N (s′) = N (s) ∪ {A};
• I(s′) = I(s) \ {A}.
– When a positive effect literal A is caused in a node s, the execution model
adds a child s′ to s such that:
• N (s′) = N (s);
• if A ∈ N (s), then I(s′) = I(s), else I(s′) = I(s) ∪ {A}.
Note that, throughout the execution model, we maintain the property that
N (s) ∩ I(s) = {}.
The overestimate U(s) is still constructed in the usual way (see [17]), with
the exception that atoms from N (s) may no longer be added to it.
To illustrate, let us consider the following simple example, where we assume
that Alice belongs to both exogenous predicates RiskyTravel and Resistant :
(Inf (Alice) : 0.2)← RiskyTravel(Alice). (5)
(¬Inf (Alice) : 1
3
)← Resistant(Alice). (6)
Representing nodes in which Alice is infected by a full circle, these two rules
may produce either of the following two execution models.
◦
0.2
(5) causes Inf
tt 0.8 **•
1
3
(6) inhibits Inf
yy 2
3
%%
◦
1
3
(6) inhibits Inf
yy 2
3
%%◦ • ◦ ◦
◦
1
3
(6) inhibits Inf
tt 23 **◦
0.2
(5) causes Inf
yy 0.8 %%
◦
0.2
(5) causes Inf
yy 0.8 %%◦ ◦ • ◦
Again, the differences between these two execution models are irrelevant, because
they both produce a distribution over final states in which P (Inf (Alice)) = 23 ·0.2,
which is of course the same probability as we obtain with formula 4 of the
previous section. Note that, in order to obtain this property, it is important that
inhibition always trumps causation, regardless of which happens first. Unlike
formula 4, the execution model semantics is equally applicable to cases with
cyclic causation.
To implement this feature of negation-in-the-head, a simple transformation
to regular CP-logic may be used. This transformation is based on the way in
which [3] encode causal ramifications in their inductive definition modelling of
the situation calculus.
For a CP-theory T in vocabulary Σ, let Σ¬ consist of all atoms A for which a
negative effect literal ¬A appears in T . For each atom A ∈ Σ¬, we introduce two
new atoms, CA and C¬A. Intuitively, CA means that there is a cause for A, and
C¬A means that there is a cause for ¬A. Let τA be the following transformation:
– Replace all positive effect literals A in the heads of rules by CA
– Replace all negative effect literals ¬A in the heads of rules by C¬A
– Add this rule: A← CA ∧ ¬C¬A
Let τ¬(T ) denote the result of applying to T , in any order, all the transformations
τA for which A ∈ Σ¬. It is clear that τ¬(T ) is a regular CP-theory, i.e., one
without negation-in-the-head. As the following theorem shows, this reduction
preserves the semantics of the theory.
Theorem 1. For each interpretation X for the exogenous predicates, the pro-
jection of piXτ¬(T ) onto the original vocabulary Σ of T is equal to pi
X
T .
When comparing the transformed theory piτ¬(T ) to the original theory T , we
see that the main benefit of having negation-in-the-head lies in its elaboration
tolerance: there is no need to know before-hand for which atoms we later might
wish to add negative effect literals, since we can always add these later, without
having to change to original rules.
6 Application: Encoding Interventions
One of the interesting uses of negation-in-the-head is related to the concept of
interventions, introduced by [13]. Let us briefly recall this notion. Pearl works in
the context of structural models. Such a model is built from a number of random
variables. For simplicity, we only consider Boolean random variables, i.e., atoms.
These are again divided into exogenous and endogenous atoms. A structural
model now consists of one equation X := ϕ for each endogenous atom X, which
defines that X is true if and only if the boolean formula ϕ holds. This set of
equations should be acyclic, in order to ensure that an assignment of values to
the exogenous atoms induces a unique assignment of values to the endogenous
ones.
A crucial property of causal models is that they can not only be used to pre-
dicts the normal behaviour of a system, but also to predict what would happen if
outside factors unexpectedly intervene with its normal operation. For instance,
consider the following simple model of which students must repeat a class:
Fail := ¬Smart ∧ ¬Effort . Repeat := Fail ∧ Required .
Under the normal operation of this “system”, only students who are not smart
can fail classes and be forced to repeat them. Suppose now that we catch a
student cheating on an assignment and decide to fail him for the class. This
action was not foreseen by the causal model, so it does not follow from the
normal behaviour. In particular, failing the student may cause him to have to
repeat the class, but if the student is actually smart, then failing him will not
make him stupid. Pearl shows that we can model our action of failing the student
by means of an intervention, denoted do(Fail = >). This is a simple syntactic
transformation, which removes and replaces the original equation for Fail:
Fail := >. Repeat := Fail ∧ Required .
According to this updated set of equations, the student fails and may have to
repeat the class, but he has not been made less smart.
In the context of CP-logic, let us consider the following simple medical theory:
(HighBloodPressure : 0.6)← BadLifeStyle. (7)
(HighBloodPressure : 0.9)← Genetics. (8)
(Fatigue : 0.3)← HighBloodPressure. (9)
Here, BadLifeStyle and Genetics are two exogenous predicates, which are both
possible causes for HighBloodPressure. Suppose now that we observe a patient
who suffers from Fatigue. Given our limited theory, this patient must be suffering
from HighBloodPressure, caused by at least one of its two possible causes.
Now, suppose that a doctor is wondering whether it is a good idea to prescribe
this patient some pills that lowers high blood pressure. Again, the proper way
to answer such a question is by means of an intervention, that first prevents
the causal mechanisms that normally determine someone’s blood pressure and
then substitutes a new “mechanism” that just makes HighBloodPressure false.
This can be achieved by simply removing the two rules (7) and (8) from the
theory. This is an instance of a general method, developed in [16], of performing
Pearl-style interventions in CP-logic. The result is that probability of Fatigue
drops to zero, i.e., P (Fatigue | do(¬HighBloodPressure)) = 0.
In this way, we can evaluate the effect of prescribing the pills without ac-
tually having these pills in our model. This is a substantial difference to the
way in which reasoning about actions is typically done in the field of knowledge
representation, where formalisms such as situation or event calculus require an
explicit enumeration of all available actions and their effects. Using an inter-
vention, by contrast, we can envisage the effects of actions that we never even
considered when writing our model.
Eventually, however, we may want to transform the above descriptive theory
into a prescriptive one that tells doctors how to best treat a patient, given his
or her symptoms. In this case, we would need rules such as this:
BPMedicine ← Fatigue. (10)
Obviously, this requires us to introduce the action BPMedicine of prescribing
the medicine, which previously was implicit in our intervention, as an explicit
action in our vocabulary. Negation-in-the-head allows us to syntactically express
the effect of this new action: ¬HighBloodPressure ← BPMedicine.
This transformation can be applied in general, as the following theorem
shows.
Theorem 2. Let T be a CP-theory over a propositional vocabulary Σ. For an
atom A ∈ Σ, let T ′ be the theory T ∪ {r} with r the rule ¬A ← B and B an
exogenous atom not in Σ. For each interpretation X for the exogenous atoms of
T ′, if B ∈ X, then piXT ′ = piXdo(T,¬A) and if B 6∈ X, then piXT ′ = piXT .
This theorem shows that negation-in-the-head allows CP-theories to “inter-
nalize” the intervention of doing ¬A. The result is a theory T ′ in which the
intervention can be switched on or off by simply choosing the appropriate in-
terpretation for the exogenous predicate that now explicitly represents this in-
tervention. Once the intervention has been syntactically added to the theory in
this way, additional rules such as (10) may of course be added to turn it from
an exogenous to an endogenous property.
It is important to note that this is a fully modular and elaboration tolerant
encoding of the intervention, i.e., the original CP-theory is left untouched and the
rules that describe the effect of the intervention-turned-action are simply added
to it. This is something that we can only achieve using negation-in-the-head.
7 Experiments
We have presented an intuitive and modular approach to express an inhibition
structure. In this section, we evaluate the computational cost associated with
this alternative structure. For this we perform inference on three theories: (i)
the inhibited noisy-or structure from Fig. 3, (ii) the inhibited noisy-or structure
translated to case splitting, and (iii) the infection example from Section 2. In-
ference was performed using ProbLog1, an SRL system to which CP-logic can
be compiled, for all three theories and using SMILE2, a state-of-the-art PGM
toolbox for the first two acyclic theories. All experiments are run on a 3GHz
Intel Core2 Duo CPU with 2GB memory and timings are averaged over 3 runs.
For the inhibited noisy-or structure, the inference can be linear depending
on the encoding of the noisy-or substructures [15, 5]. The results (fig. 4a) show
that the use of negative effect literals, implemented by means of their noisy-or
encoding, is always more efficient than case splitting. Surprisingly, when using
SMILE the inference has exponential complexity with a growing number of par-
ents. This indicates that, although we used noisy-max encodings, noisy-or is not
fully exploited. ProbLog is able to exploit the local structure more efficiently and
performs inference for the inhibited noisy-or in time polynomial in the number
of parents.
The infection example contains cycles and can therefore only be processed
by ProbLog. For this theory, we let the number of people increase, while keeping
the number of contacts per person fixed (Fig. 4b). This increases the number
of inhibited noisy-or structures but, contrary to the previous theory, not the
number of parents. We see that the version using case splitting is slower with
approximately a constant factor.
We can conclude that the overhead introduced by the encoding for negative
literals in the head is marginal compared to normal noisy-or combinations and
inference can be performed efficiently.
1 http://dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/problog
2 http://genie.sis.pitt.edu
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Number of parents
100
101
102
103
104
105
Ti
me
 (
ms
ec
)
Total time
Case Splitting - ProbLog
Negative head - ProbLog
Case splitting - SMILE
Negative head - SMILE
(a) Inference for an inhibited noisy-or structure.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of people
140
200
170
Ti
me
 (
ms
ec
)
Total time
Case splitting - ProbLog
Negative head - ProbLog
(b) Inference for the infection ex-
ample.
Fig. 4. Runtime of inference.
8 Related Work
8.1 Inhibited Recursive Noisy-or
The structure we obtain is related to the inhibited recursive noisy-or structure
[10] which states that:
Pr(Y |X) = Pr(Y caused by X) · Pr(Y not inhibited by X)
The two parts are recursive noisy-or models, a generalisation of noisy-or that re-
laxes the ICI assumption. It allows to encode synergies, the combination of two
causes to have a stronger effect than expected, and interferences, the combina-
tion to have a softer effect. A problem, however, with recursive noisy-or models
is that the parametrisation may be asymmetric. As this causes confusion and
conflicts, this model does not allow for a modular representation and is not pop-
ular in common use [4]. Different in CP-logic is that concepts like synergy and
interference are not represented using a recursive parametric probability distri-
bution but directly in the program using the conditions in the body and positive
and negative literals. As such, CP-logic, offers a modular and non-conflicting
alternative to inhibited recursive noisy-or models.
8.2 The Certainty Factor Model
Rule-based systems are popular for expert and diagnostics systems because they
offer an intuitive syntax to human experts. In this setting, the concept of weigh-
ing the level of uncertainty of inhibiting factors has been proposed for certainty
factors used in the MYCIN system [1, 11]. The weighing, however, is performed
independently for the measures of belief and disbelief and are joined only af-
terwards to define the certainty factor. These notions of uncertainty are not
well-founded from a probabilistic point of view but are used in practice be-
cause they are computationally simple and behave satisfactorily. It was argued
that the Bayesian framework was unsatisfactory because it would require too
many conditional probability parameters that have to be filled in by an expert.
This was a motivation to use the two different measures, one for belief and one
for disbelief. The simplicity of the certainty factor model, however, was achieved
only with frequently unrealistic assumptions and with persistent confusion about
the meaning of the numbers being used [8]. Heckerman and Shortlife show how
Bayesian nets can be used to represent the certainty factor model in a principled
manner. Unfortunately, they show that “uncertain reasoning is inherently less
modular than is logical reasoning”, which is an attractive feature of the certainty
factor model. In this work we show that both concepts of belief and disbelief can
be represented in one rule-based framework with a strong foundation in proba-
bility theory and with the modularity properties of logical reasoning.
8.3 Interaction Rules in Probabilistic Logic
Negation in the head can be interpreted as a modification of the noisy-or inter-
action rule that is common among probabilistic logics. Probabilistic interaction
logic [9] is a framework that generalizes languages like CP-logic and ProbLog
to allow custom encodings of the interaction rules. This is achieved by building
on top of default logic instead of logic programming. Part of the example in
Section 2 can be expressed as:
D = {RiskyTravel(x) ∧ p(x) : Inf (x)
Inf (x)
}, W = {Resistant(x) ∧ q(x)→ ¬Inf (x)}
with P (p(x)) = 0.2 and P (q(x)) = 1/3. Here, the single default in D expresses
that, if x has done risky travel, this will cause her to be infected with probability
0.2, unless we know otherwise. The implication in W then gives precisely such a
reason for knowing otherwise, namely, the fact that x might be resistant.
This logic is obviously quite general, allowing many more interaction patterns
to be expressed than just the simple inhibited effects we have considered here.
However, it does depend on the user to correctly encode these patterns in first-
order logic: for instance, adding the inhibiting effect of being resistant will require
a change to the original theory, unless the user had the foresight to already
include the justification Inf (x) in his original default.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the new language feature of negative effect
literals. We have shown this for the case of CP-logic where it offers a natural
extension the capacity to represent causal models in a modular way. In the
particular case of theories that correspond to a Bayesian net, such negative effect
literals correspond to an inhibited noisy-or structure. Additionally, we show that
this new language feature can be encoded in such a manner that inference can
be performed with a complexity similar to standard noisy-or.
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